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NOTES

EQUITTABLE LEINS AS A REMEDY IN RESTITUTION
IN PENNSYLVANIA
When a party is entitled to restitution from another, there are several remedies which he may have. In certain cases the party is entitled to use self-help.
The courts offer certain remedies. The courts may decree specific restitution, enforce a constructive trust, enforce an equitable lien, subrogate the party to the
position of a prior claimant or order the payment of money by the person who
received the benefit. The courts of Pennsylvania recognized all these remedies
at an early date with the exception of the equitable lien. This remedy was flatly
rejected by the courts because they could find no authority for recognizing it in
the statutory or common law of the state. Probably, the fact that no court of
equity existed in the state until recently had much to do with this. When courts
with equity jurisdiction were finally established, they had only those powers which
the statute conferred on them. The statute was very strictly construed and, even
today, equity jurisdiction exists only so far as the statute authorizes it.
The Early Rule ...The following cases set out the early rule as to equitable

liens:
In Hepburn v. Snyder,' A conveyed certain land to B in exchange for B's
payment of a sum of money plus B's promise to indemnify A against future
liabilities that may arise out of X company of which A had been an owner. On
B's failure to pay A's liabilities, A brought an action of ejectment claiming, among
other things, that an equitable lien attached to the land for the amount of the liabilities. The court said, "Liens upon land are not favored or to be implied; and
they are consequently to be created by plain terms ...Equitable liens . . .have
not been engrafted on the jurisprudence of Pennsylvania."
In a later case, Appeal of Cross,2 the Pennsylvania Court reaffirmed this view

citing the Hepburn case. W was appointed guardian of A and M, minors, without
being required to give bond. He received money on behalf of his wards from time
to time which he mingled with his own and invested in the erection of buildings on
his farm. Upon settlement of the accounts, there was a balance due. In the interim, W had confessed several judgments and had become insolvent. A and
M wanted their claim against W's estate to be preferred by way of the enforcement of a trust or a lien upon the land because improvements had been made
with their money. The court held that a trust arises only where there is fraud
or where payment of the purchase price with the trust funds vests title in the
trustee. Then, as to a lien, the court said:
"But it is said, the money of these beneficiaries has been used to improve
this property, and they ought, therefore, to have a lien upon it to the
extent of the moneys so expended. But what kind of a lien? Not a statutory
1 Hepburn v. Snyder, 3 Pa. 72, (1846).
2 Appeal of Anna J. Cross and A. W. Gault, Guardian, etc. 97 Pa. 471, (1881).
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one, for the Act of 1832, which would give them a lien, was not pursued. A lien arising from the equitable circumstances of the case? But
such a lien is unknown in Pennsylvania jurisprudence; it has not been
as yet engrafted upon our legal system, and it is hoped that it never
will be: Hepburn v. Snyder, 3 Pa. 72. This is, no doubt, a hard case,
but were we to establish the doctrine of equitable liens for the purpose
of meeting this hard case, it would be like the letting out of water, disaster and confusion would be the result. In vain would the unfortunate
judgment creditor depend upon the dockets and records provided for
his protection. Debts that he thought secure would be swept away by the
insidious operation of secret equitable liens. With the utmost confidence
might he bid in a tract of land to cover his judgment, only to find in
the end that he had involved himself, and perhaps hopelessly for tht
benefit of someone else. Nor would a mortgagee be in a much better
situation, for though he is in a better position than a judgment creditor,
in that he is partially protected by the recording acts, yet he would always be exposed to the danger of having sprung upon him proof of
notice of some hidden lien for which he was wholly unprepared. How
easily such notice can be proved since the Act of 1869, we all understand.
We think, therefore, it is better for us to adhere to the old paths, with
which we are well acquainted, rather than try new ones which may lead
us to unexpected disaster."
The Hepburn case was cited in David Hackadorn's Appea 8 for the proposition that liens must be created in plain terms. The court added "The principle is
not, as supposed, confined to contracts, but it is applicable to wills as to other
instrum'ents."
In Hartman v. Keown, 4 the court held a lien existed in the bailee when
a bailee took an assignment of a debt, where the security for the debt was a bill
of sale for the bailed property. This case, however, is not considered a change from
the general rule since the bailee had possession of the subject matter of the lien.
The early rule was that the equitable lien would be recognized and enforced
only if the parties expressly designated that specific property should be held as
security for a debt or duty. This rule was applicable to personalty and realty; and to
contracts, wills and other types of instruments.
There were two principal objections to the recognition of equitable liens in
Pennsylvania. First, equity jurisdiction was conferred by statute and equitable liens
were not included among the equity powers of the court. Second, as expressed in
the Cross case,' an intervening third party purchaser would be harmed if an equitable lien were enforced. The first objection has never been seriously discussed. The
second objection presupposes that an equitable lien is retroactive to the time the
lienor's equity arose.
8

David Hackadorn's Appeal, 11 Pa. 86, (1850).
Hartman v. Keown, 101 Pa. 338, (1881).
5 Appeal of Anna J. Cross, etc. supra.
4
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This second obj'ection gives rise to several questions. Is an equitable lien
retroactive to a) the time the lienor's equity arises, or b) to the time when the
lienor first claims he has a lien in the property, or c) to the time when the court
decrees that a lien exists? In the Cross case, the court felt that a lien was retroactive
to the time the lienor's equity arose. However, there are several good reasons why
the equitable lien should arise at some other time. For instance, by analogy to
legal liens, equitable liens should arise only after the lienor claims to have such
lien. It may also be argued that the rights of innocent third parties will be prejudiced if the lien is made retroactive, that is, earlier than the courts adjudication.
And, therefore, the lien should arise only after the court's adjudication.
It has been generally held that the equitable lien is retroactive to the time
the lienor's equity arose. This is the early view and the view adopted by the Restatement.
If a lien is made retroactive, we must avoid harming innocent third party
purchasers. The problem is: What constitutes notice to an innocent third party?
The court, in the Cross case recognized the general policy of the law of protecting
innocent third party purchasers. However, they felt that, since it was so 'easy to show
that the third party had notice, the policy of the law would be defeated. Hence,
the lien should not be recognized. This same problem was answered in another way
ina later case.6
The defendant had been adjudicated weakminded in an earlier proceeding.
In a suit for restitution, the defendant tried to assert the defense of incapacity to
contract and to show the prior adjudication of weakmindedness was notice to the
plaintiff. The court found no difficulty in solving the problem. They said that the
adjudication of weakmindedness under the particular statute was not such notice
as would prejudice the plaintiff's right to restitution. Perhaps, the court could
have applied the same reasoning to the Cross case so as to give the plaintiff a
remedy which he rightfully should have gotten. Apparently, the problem of the
retroactive effect of liens and what constitutos notice were solved because equitable
liens have been recognized and enforced in Pennsylvania since the Cross case.
How much the old rule has been changed is still questionable.
The Modern Rule. Most of the cases in which the Pennsylvania courts
have enforced equitable liens are cases where improvements have been made to
one person's property with another person's money or property so as to amount to
unjust enrichment.
In Peoples National Bank of Pittsburghv. Loeffert, 7 a debtor conspired with
another to defraud his creditors, furishing materials to make improvements on the
other's land. The creditor obtained a judgment against the debtor. The court of
equity dedared this judgment to be a lien upon the land of the other that had
6 Pulaski v. Provident, infra. note 10.
7 Peoples National Bank of Pittsburgh and E. J. Larkins v. George Loeffert, John Loeffert and Al-

bert L. Loeffert, 184 Pa. 164, 38 Ad. 996, (1898).
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been improved. That is, a judgment against one person, was made a lien upon
another person's land. The Supreme Court ruled that, while this was irregular,

it would not be set aside because it did substantial justice. The court suggested
a better method, that is, to ascertain the amount of the debtor's property which
had become merged in the other's realty, and award a lien on the realty for that
amount. Note that this is the remedy asked for in the Cross case just 17 years before when it had been refused.
A recent case, Gladowski v. Felczak,8 further extended the rule. Here the
plaintiff loaned money to an association taking a mortgage on realty as security.
The proceeds of the loan were used to discharge a judgment lien on the property
and the balance was used for improvements to the property. Later it was found
that the conveyance to the association was void. The plaintiff asked to have his
void mortgage declared a lien upon the realty. The court enforced the lien basing
part of it on subrogation to the prior lienor's rights and part of it an unjust
enrichment, for the improvements made. The court cited sections. 161 and 162
of the Restatement of Restitution as authority for these propositions.
In a lower court case, Stathopulos v. Stathopulos,9 a beneficiary of a resulting
trust to a fractional interest in realty, wanted a lien asserted for repairs and improvements he had made to the property. The court refused to enforce a lien because the plaintiff had been a volunteer.
Generally, it is stated that an equitable lien on goods sold does not arise
in favor of a vendor for unpaid purchase money. The vendor can by express
terms reserve an interest in the goods for unpaid purchase money, but this reservation is not implied from the sale. Certain exceptions have been made to this rule.
In Pulaski v. Provident0 the plaintiff took a purchase money mortgage on certain realty. After partial repayment, the defendant mortgagor defaulted, the plaintiff obtained a judgment upon which he sought execution. The defendant's wife
claimed that defendant was weakminded and lacked the capacity to contract. Plaintiff then asked that an equitable lien be enforced on the realty based on unjust
enrichment. The court held that this was a proper case for such relief citing the
Restatement of Restitution Sections 161 and 139 as authority for this proposition.
A lower court case, Houghton v. Restland,11 refused to enforce an equitable
lien. Petitioners conveyed certain realty for cemetery purposes to a corporation,
receiving therefore shares of preferred stock in the corporation. The corporation
was to deposit 5% of its receipts from the sale of lots for the payment of 6%
8 Gladowski et al. v. Felczak et al., 346 Pa. 660, 31 At. 2d 718, (1943).

9 $tathopulos v. Stathopulos, 51 Lanc. Rev. 177, (1947).
10 General Casmir Pulaski Building and Loan Association v. Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia, 338 Pa. 198, 12 At. 2d 567, (1940).
11 Houghton et ux., v. Restland Memorial Park, Inc., 88 Pitt. L. J. 557, (1940) affirmed in 343 Pa.
625, 23 At. 2d 497, (1942). Only the lower court considered the validity of an equitable lien in its
decision.
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interest and for the redemption of the preferred stock. Several years later, the court
appointed a liquidating receiver of the asstst of the corporation. Petitioners contended that the preferred stock was not payment for the land but collateral security for payment outlined in option agreement prior to the actual sale of the
land and that their claim to the land should be preferred to the general creditors
of the corporation. The court refused to enforce a lien, citing Hepburn v. Snyder
and Appeal of Cross, 12 two early cases, for the rule that equitable liens do not
exist in Pennsylvania. Failure to pay the purchase price gives rise only to a cause
of action in contract. This case, however, is explainable in two ways: (1) The contract purported to be complete on-its face and the court does not admit parol evidence in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake. (2) Innocent third party creditors intervened. They should not be made to suffer by equities between the original
parties of which they have no notice.
A later case, Proudley v. Fidelity,'8 also denied equitable relief. In an action
in assumpsit the use plaintiff ran a busin-ss whereby a person was insured by
putting up 25% of the premium and use plaintiff put up 75% of the premium in
exchange for notes for the loan, and a power of attorney to cancel the policy
of insurance and collect the unearned premium which was to be applied to the
debt. The use plaintiff attempted and the insurer refused to cancel certain policies.
The use plaintiff sued the insurer for unearned premiums on the theory that payment
of 75% of the purchase price (premium) gave rise to an equitable lien on the
proceeds of the policies. The court refused to recognize a lien in this situation
because (1) the use plaintiff was a volunteer and an equitable lien does not arise
in favor of a volunteer and (2) a person who lends money to be used by a borrower to purchase property does not acquire an equitable lien in the property
thereby.
The cases which are concerned with purchase money follow the general rule.
In the Pulaski case, 14 an entirely different principle of restitution was applied.
In this case, the defendant was an incompetent. Generally, when an innocent
party contracts with an incompetent reasonably thinking the contract is valid, he
can recover, on principles of restitution, that much of the benefit that he has conf'erred upon the incompetent that still remains in the hands of the incompetent. 15
This would entitle the plaintiff to sell the property which the defendant holds,
since it was the proceeds of the benefit conferred remaining in the hands of the
defendant. This would work a hardship upon the defendant and jeopardize his
equity in the realty. Also, the sale of the realty to satisfy the judgment was not
desired by either party. So the court allowed an equitable lien to be asserted on
the realty to the extent of the benefit conferred. It had the effect of reinstating
the mortgage. In the Pulaski case, a constructive trus twould not be a remedy be12 Supra, notes 1 and 2.
18 Proudley et al., v. Fidelity and Guaranty Fire Corporation, 345 Pa. 385, 29 At. 2d 48, (1942).

14 Supra, note 10.
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cause title had not been obtained solely with the plaintiff's money, nor was it
intended that the defendant should hold the property for the benefit of the plaintiff except to secure the loan. This is not sufficient to support a constructive
trust.
In several miscellaneous cases, equitable liens have been claimed. They have
generally not been recognized. In Baronofsky v. Weiss, 6 the plaintiff leased certain
realty and chattels. The defendant deposited certain monies to secure the return
of the chattels. At the termination of the lease, the plaintiff brought repkvin
to recover the chattels. The defendant claimed he had a lien in the chattels to secure the return of his deposit money. The court decided that the defendant had
an equitable lien that would be recognized in an action of replevin. The court
cited Ruling Case Law17 which says that an equitable lien is implied or declared
by a court of equity out of the general considerations of right and justice as applied to the relations of the parties and the circumstances of their dealings. But
here, it might have been argued that there was an implied promise to return the
deposit money on return of the chattels, and that the defendant had a right to
possession until the money was returned.
A lower court case, McHugh v. Landherr'8 presented an unusual situation.
A had a judgment against P and a judgment against D. P had a judgment against
D. A tried to execute on her judgment against D but execution was returned nulla
bona. A tried to execute on her judgment against P and it was only partially satisfied. Then P tried to execute on his judgment against D. The sheriff found a car
on which to levy, sold it to satisfy P's judgment against D and held the proceeds
of the sale. A wanted the proceeds turned over to her; basing her claim on her
judgment against P and claiming an equitable lien existed on the money the
sheriff held. The court refused to grant A relief because (1) Funds in the hands
of a sheriff are not subject to attachment and (2) Equitable liens are stirctly limited in Pennsylvania, citing Hepburn v. Snyder and Appeal of Cross.19 The court said
that equitable lien could arise in this situation if there was an antecedent and underlying agreement in the nature of an assignment of funds in the hands of the sheriff
as security for P's debt to A. A moral obligation is not sufficient to support an
equitable lien. This, of course, is the early rule.
The Restatement of Restitution. The Restatement of Restitution recognizes
three remedies which a court of equity can give in order that an injured party
may have restitution.
(1) The Constructive Trust.20 This is asserted where the defendant holds
legal title to property and it would be unjust to allow him to retain it. The title
15 Restatement, Restitution, § 139 (1937).
16 Baronofsky v. Weiss, 120 Pa. Super. 126, 182 At. 47, (1935).

17 10 RCL 351.
1s McHugh v. Landherr, 52 D & C 481, (1945).
10 Supra, notes 1 and 2.
20 Restatement, Restitution, § 160, (1937).
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holder is made the constructive trustee of the property and is under an equitable
duty to convey the property to the beneficiary. The constructive trust is also used
in certain non-restitutionary situations such as, at the termination of an express
trust, under an enforceable contract to convey land, etc. Ordinarily, the recovery
allowed is the amount of the enrichment of the titleholder. Specific restitution may
be allowed where the trustee is insolvent or the subject matter is unique. The constructive beneficiary's right to recovery from the trustee is prior to that of the
trustee's general creditors whether or not the constructive trust is specifically
enforceable.
(2) The EquitableDen.21 This is asserted where one party has a claim upon
another that would result in unjust enrichment if not paid. A lien is the claim which
one person has upon the property of another as a security for some debt or charge. 22
It is an alternate remedy with the constructive trust where the defendant misappropriates money or property and buys other property. Where the value of the
property has fallen, the lien is more advantageous because the lienor can get the
full value of his claim and if the proceeds from the sale of the property will not
cover the claim, the lienor can go against the lienee. Where the value of the
property has risen, the constructive trust is a better remedy because the lienor
can claim his fractional interest in the property getting the amount of his claim
plus any increase in value. Where improvements have been made to land an equitable lien may be enforced but not a constructive trust. Under the Restatement, the
equitable lien is broader than a constructive trust as a restitutionary remedy for
this reason. The equitable lien, if asserted on a fund, is enforced by a court order
to pay the aggrieved party out of the fund. If asserted on other property, then
the court orders that, on failure to pay the claim, the property is to be seized and
sold to satisfy the claim. The lienholder's rights rise higher than the lienee's
general creditors, as to the property upon which the lien is asserted. If the owner
disposes of the property, the lien attaches to the property in the hands of the third
person if he has notice of the equitable lien, or the lien can attach to the property
acquired from the disposition of the original property.
(3) Subrogation.23 Where the property of one person is used to discharge
a claim against another person in such a way as to result in unjust enrichment, the
first person is subrogated to the position of the previous claimholder. If D buys
a claim against T with P's money, D becomes constructive trustee of the claim for
P. If D discharges a claim that T has against D's property with P's money, D becomes lienee of the property for P (lienor-subrogee). The lienor, however, is
in no better position with relation to other creditors than the prior lienor was.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited the Restatement of Restitution in both
the Pulaski case and the Gladowski case, 2 4 for the proposition that equitable liens
21 Restatement, Restitution, § 161, (1937).
22 Baronofsky v. Weiss, supra, note 16.
28 Restatement, Restitution, § 162, (1937).
24 Sup-a, notes 8 and 10.
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are recognized and enforced in Pennsylvania in the situations set down in Section 161. Since this section sets down only a broad policy as to equitable liens, we
cannot yet say that the doctrine of equitable liens as set out in the Restatement of
Restitution is the law in Pennsylvania. Further, the lower courts in the Houghton
case and the McHugh case, 25 have said that equitable liens exist only when they
are expressly created. About all we can say is that the Pennsylvania courts have
recognized equitable liens in some situations.
The principal situation in which both the Restatement of Restitution and the
Pennsylvania courts recognize the equitable lien is where improvements have been
made to property under the inducement of fraud, duress, undue influence, and mistake.
26
Fraud as a basis for an equitable lien is recognized in the Loeffert case,
The situation in the Loeffert case is not specifically in point with any situation
mentioned in the Restatement. Section 170 refers to a plaintiff who makes improvements to another's land under the inducement of fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake. Section 206 refers to the situation where a wrongdoer uses property
of another to improve his own land. In the Loeffert case, a person wrongfully
used his own property to improve the realty of a conspirator for the purpose of
defrauding third persons. Actually the court recognized that the improver had a
claim against his conspirator for improvements. This claim became part of the
assets upon which the improver's creditors could levy. The situation in the Loeffert
case falls more nearly into Section 208(2).

Mistake as a basis for an equitable lien is recognized in the Gladowski case.
The Gladowski case does not fall quite squarely into Section 170 because it was
not the plaintiff who made the improvements to the land. The plaintiff loaned the
money to the grantee of the void conveyance and it was that person who made
the improvements. So actually the court had traced a benefit. To take the plaintiff
out of the class of volunteer, the court said the improvements were required and
desired. Several other reasons might have been given. The plaintiff conferred
the benefit at the request of the grantee of the void conveyance reasonably
thinking he had title. Also the membership in the grantee and grantor associations
of the void conveyance were the same. A final reason may be that since the court
had opened the door to restitution by subrogation, they would grant other restitutionary relief.
In Pennsylvania, a constructive beneficiary and a subrogee both can have
equitable liens on the property to secure their interests in the property. But, where
there is no constructive trust or subrogation, the equitable lien may nevertheless, be
recognized and enforced. The Restatement gives several situations in which the
plaintiff has alternate remedies of constructive trust or an equitable lien. For
25 Supra, notes 11 and 18.
26 Supra, note 7.
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instance, where A wrongfully uses $500 of B's money and $500 of his own money
to purchase certain realty, can B claim an undivided half interest in the realty or
an equitable lien for his $500 at B's election? The Pennsylvania decisions do not
indicate that there is such an election. Where A acquires title entirely or partly
with B's money, the courts enforce a constructive trust in favor of B to the fractional
extent that B's money paid for the property. Where improvem'ents have been
made to property with B's money or property the Pennsylvania courts enforce an
equitable lien. In other situations where the equities are heavily in favor of the
plaintiff and no other remedy is available, the courts have indicated that they
will enforce an equitable lien.
Advantages of an equitable lien as against a judgment lien. The question
is posed: if a plaintiff is entitled to restitution for a benefit conferred upon another, when would an equitable lien be advantageous over a judgment lien?
The judgment can become a lien on all the property of the lienee and the equitable
lien is a lien on certain specific property only. There are several answers to this.
A judgment can only become a lien after it has been docketed. The proper docketing becomes notice. An equitable lien is retroactive to the time when the equity
arose. This equity is only cut off if an innocent third party purchaser intervenes.
Since you claim an interest in the property, you can tie up the property so that
it cannot be transferred or dissipated until your rights in the property are adjudicated.
A lien has a decided advantage where there is a possibility that the defe-ndant
may become insolvent or go out of existence before the case is decided. If the defendant becomes insolvent, or goes out of existence, then the lien becomes a preferred claim, as to the subject matter of the lien, over the general creditors of the
defendant.
Another advantage is that if the plaintiff wants to obtain the property itself,
he has a better chance of getting it if he has a lien. If the plaintiff has a judgment
against the defendant, execution can be made on any of the defendant's property.
But if the plaintiff has an equitable lien on the specific property, execution is on
that specific property first. The plaintiff can then bid in on it at the execution sale.
The Baronofsky case 2 7 illustrates another advantage. In a suit for replevin,
a counterclaim will not lie. But if the defendant can show a lien in the property,
it will be recognized. The courts of Pennsylvania will recognize an equitable
lien in the property in a suit in replevin.
Finally, a lien on specific property has the advantage that the property is not
subject to an exemption claim of the debtor.
LeRoy Greenspan
27

Supra, note 16.

